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CONNECTICUT'S BIRTH CONTROL LAW: REVIEWING A
STATE STATUTE UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT*
THE power of a state to prohibit the use of contraceptives by married
persons is currently being tested before the United States Supreme Court.'
Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of a Connecticut anticontraceptive
statute on the ground that it violates the due process provisions of the four-
teenth amendment. Although thirty-four states 2 and the federal government 3
have in force some form of birth control legislation, only Connecticut 4 and
Massachusetts 5 severely restrict legal means of obtaining contraceptives. 6
The Connecticut statute provides that "any person who uses any drug, me-
dicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be
fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor
more than one year or both fined and imprisoned."7 Passed in 1879 as a
*Poe v. Ullman and Buxton v. Ullman, decided below in a single opinion, Buxton v.
Ullman, 147 Conn. 48, 156 A.2d 508 (1959), probable jurisdiction noted, 362 U.S. 987
(1960) (Nos. 810 and 811, 1959 Term; renumbered Nos. 60 and 61, 1960 Term), motion
to postpone argument intil February term granted, 29 U.S.L. WEEK 3101 (Oct. 11, 1960).
Mr. Justice Frankfurter took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases. Ibid.
1. Ibid.
2. See statutes collected in Appendix A.
3. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461-62 (1958) ; Tariff Act of 1930, 46 Stat. 688, 19 U.S.C. § 1305
(1958) ; see Note, 50 YALE L.J. 682 (1941).
4. CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 53-32 (1958).
5. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, §§ 20-21 (1956). For judicial interpretation of
the statute, see Commonwealth v. Werlinsky, 307 Mass. 608, 29 N.E.2d 150 (1940) ; Com-
monwealth v. Corbett, 307 Mass. 7, 29 N.E.2d 151 (1940) ; Commonwealth v. Gardner,
300 Mass. 372, 15 N.E.2d 222 (1938) ; Commonwealth v. Allison, 227 Mass. 57, 116 N.E.
265 (1917). Attempts to write a medical exception into the statute by referendum were
defeated in 1942 and 1948. ST. JOHN-STEvAs, BIRTH CONTROL AND PUBLIC POLICY 22
(1960) [hereinafter cited as ST. JOHN-STEVAS].
6. The typical statute prohibits the sale and/or advertisement of contraceptives, but
contains an exception which allows physicians and often pharmacists to distribute them
for "medical" reasons. For a listing and classification of the statutes, see ST. JOHN-STEVAS
82-83; ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES 196-99 (Calderone ed. 1958).
States with statutes as prohibitory in language as Connecticut or Massachusetts have
permitted birth control clinics. Brief for Planned Parenthood Federation of America as
Amicus Curiae, apps. E & F. The New Jersey statute prohibiting sale of contraceptives
"without just cause" was held unconstitutional because of the vagueness of the standard.
State v. Kinney Bldg. Drug Stores, Inc., 56 N.J. Super. 37, 151 A.2d 430 (Essex County
Ct. 1959). The federal statutes have been read to include an e-xception for medical pur-
poses. Consumers Union v. Walker, 145 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1944) ; United States v. One
Package, 86 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1936). For a history of attempts to amend the federal
statutes, see SULLOWAY, BIRTH CONTROL AND CATHOLIC DOCTRINE 190-91 n.20 (1959).
7. CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 53-32 (1958). This statute is implemented by a general
accessory statute which provides that "any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes,
hires or commands another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if
he were the principal offender." CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 54-196 (1958).
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result of the moral fervor generated by Anthony Comstock's nation-wide
crusade against obscenity and vice,8 the statute has survived repeated attempts
at amendment and repeal."
The Connecticut statute has survived two challenges to its constitutionality.
In State v. Nelson,'0 the only prosecution under the statute in its 81-year
history, two physicians and a nurse were charged with advising and assisting
a married woman to use contraceptives in order to prevent pregnancy and
thus preserve her "general health." The trial court sustained demurrers to
the informations. The court found that the statute could not be construed
to contain an exception which would allow physicians to prescribe contra-
ceptives to married women whose "general health" would be adversely affected
by pregnancy. In the absence of such an exception, the court held, the statute
was unconstitutional as a deprivation of "individual liberty" without due
process. 11 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut reversed,
holding that the statute need not include a "general health" exception in order
to be a valid exercise of the police power of the state. The question of statutory
construction which the court in Nelson recognized but was not required by
the facts to consider-"whether an implied exception might be recognized
when 'pregnancy would jeopardize life' I'-was answered two years later
in Tileston v. Ullrnan,13 in which a physician sought a declaratory judgment
on this issue. The Supreme Court of Errors again refused to read an exception
into the statute, holding that the legislature could reasonably find that "ab-
stinence from intercourse is a reasonable and practicable method of preventing
the unfortunate consequences [of conception]. ' 14 An appeal to the United
States Supreme Court was dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff-physician,
by contending solely that the statute deprived his patients of life without due
process of law, had failed to assert a denial of his own constitutional rights and
therefore lacked standing to challenge the statute.15
8. See HANEY, COMSTOCKERY IN AmERICA 18-25 (1960).
9. Legislation to amend the statute was introduced in the House and Senate at the
biennial sessions of 1923, 1925, 1927, 1931 (twice), 1933, 1935, 1941 (three times), 1943,
1945, 1947, 1949, 1951, 1953, 1955, 1957, and 1959. In some of these years it passed the
House but was defeated in the Senate. Legislation which would have repealed the statute
was introduced in 1917, 1927, and 1929. The statute has also withstood six general re-
visions of the Connecticut statutes, made in 1888, 1902, 1918, 1930, 1949, and 1958. For a
complete summary of the legislative history see Brief for Appellee, pp. 3-7, Tileston v.
Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943); Buxton v. Ullman, 147 Conn. 48, 56-57, 156 A.2d 508, 513
(1959).
10. 126 Conn. 412, 11 A.2d 856 (1940), Note, 20 B.U.L. REv. 551 (1940), Note, 31
J. Am. INSTITUTE CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 312 (1940).
11. State v. Nelson, 7 Conn. Supp. 262 (New Haven County Ct. 1939).
12. 126 Conn. at 418, 11 A.2d at 859.
13. 129 Conn. 84, 26 A.2d 582 (1942), Note, 23 B.U.L. Rv. 115 (1943), Note, 17
ST. JoHN's L. REv. 122 (1943), Note, 16 So. CAL. L. REv. 224 (1943).
14. 129 Conn. at 92, 26 A.2d at 586.
15. 318 U.S. 44, 46 (1943).
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Poe v. Ullman 16 is the third test of constitutionality. The appellants in
Poe brought independent actions seeking declaratory judgments that the statute
violated their rights under the fourteenth amendment. Jane Doe, a married
woman, suffers from a number of serious physical and emotional conditions,
and in the opinion of her physician another pregnancy will result in irreparable
injury and possible death. The second appellants, Paul and Pauline Poe, are
husband and wife. Mrs. Poe has given birth to three children, each with
multiple congenital abnormalities inconsistent with life, and her physician be-
lieves that another pregnancy before the cause of these abnormalities can be
identified and corrected would be "extremely disturbing" to the physical and
emotional health of both husband and wife.' 7 The trial court sustained a
demurrer to both complaints. The Supreme Court of Errors, in affirming,
recognized the potential harm which might result from prohibiting the use of
contraceptives but concluded that "[this] fact does not make it absolutely
necessary for the legislature" to permit their use, even when medically indi-
cated, if a reasonable alternative exists.' 8 The court found "abstinence from
sexual intercourse" to be an alternative and refused to investigate its reason-
ableness beyond the finding that it was not clearly unreasonable.1 9
At the outset, the appeal raises a jurisdictional question: does this action
for declaratory judgment present a justiciable case or controversy as required
by article III, section 2 of the Constitution? Some doubt may be cast upon
the sufficiency of the allegations in Poe by the case of United Pub. Workers
v. Mitchell,20 in which federal employees sought a declaratory judgment on the
constitutionality of the Hatch Act, which prohibits federal workers from partici-
pating "in political management or in political campaigns." 21 The Supreme
Court held that no justiciable case or controversy was presented, because the
uncertainty as to the kinds of political activity the appellants meant to engage
in made it impossible to determine whether prohibition of this activity would
violate their freedom of speech under the first amendment. The holding in
Mitchell, however, has been considerably weakened. 22 In Adler v. Board of
16. 147 Conn. 48, 156 A2d 508 (1959). The names of the appellants are fictitious.
17. The final appellant is Dr. C. Lee Buxton, a gynecologist and professor at Yale
Medical School; he is the physician of the other appellants. He contends that the Con-
necticut statute prevents him from practicing his profession "according to the scientific
principles on which it is based" and thereby deprives him of liberty and property in vio-
lation of the fourteenth amendment. Brief for Appellants, pp. 7, 67-71.
This Note will discuss only the claims of the first two appellants. Because Dr. Buxton
is prohibited from prescribing contraceptives only by the general accessory statute, see
note 7 supra, his claim will be moot to the extent that the Court allows plaintiffs' claim.
18. 147 Conn. at 58, 156 A.2d at 514.
19. Id. at 58-59, 156 A.2d at 514.
20. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
21. Hatch Political Activity Act, 53 Stat. 1147 (1939), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 118(i)
(1958).
22. See 3 DAvis, ADMixiSTRATrV LAW § 21.06, at 162-64 (1958) ; Davis, Standing,




Education,2 the Court rendered a decision on the merits in a declaratory
judgment action brought by parents, teachers, and taxpayers challenging the
constitutionality of a New York statute which required discharge of any public
school employee who engaged in subversive political activity. Despite a strong
dissent by Mr. Justice Frankfurter pointing out that the failure of appellees
to allege that they had engaged or intended to engage in prohibited conduct
placed the facts of Adler squarely within the "controlling relevance"
24 of
Mitchell, the Court did not discuss the issue of whether a justiciable case or
controversy existed. In the subsequent case of Evers v. Dwyer,25 the Court
explicitly held that an action for declaratory judgment was an appropriate
method for testing the constitutionality of a state statute requiring racially-
segregated seating on buses; the complainant was not "bound to continue to ride
the Memphis buses at the risk of arrest" in order "to demonstrate the existence
of an 'actual controversy' over the validity of the [challenged] statute .... -26
This holding would seem to suggest that actual arrest or prosecution is not a
necessary element of a justiciable case or controversy if it is clear from the
facts presented that enforcement of a statute will limit an individual's freedom
to do "what he claims a constitutional privilege to do without restraint. '27
In the present case, the desired conduct of the appellants is definite and
specific and would clearly violate the statute. And by demurring to the com-
plaint, the state has admitted appellants' allegation that the state "intends to
prosecute any offenses against the Statutes .... -"28 Even without this admission,
appellants should be entitled to rely on a presumption that the statute will be
enforced, despite the fact that in the past the state has not been overly vigorous
in prosecuting violations.2  Otherwise, the protection of their rights will be
made to rest on the continued inaction of state enforcement officers.A0
Once the jurisdictional obstacle is overcome and the central issue of consti-
tutionality is reached, the Court will be faced with the primary contention of
appellant-patients: application of the statute to them results in the creation of
serious risks to life and health and therefore violates the fourteenth amendment.
23. 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
24. Id. at 503.
25. 358 U.S. 202 (1958). Although the question of justiciability related to the Federal
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1958), it has been uniformly held that the
term "actual controversy" is used in the act in the constitutional sense. E.g., Public Ser-
vice Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237 (1952).
26. 358 U.S. at 204. In its per curiam opinion the Supreme Court found the intention
to create a test case "not significant." Ibid.
27. See Borchard, Challenging "Penal" Statutes by Declaratory Action, 52 YALE L.J.
445, 457 (1943).
28. Amended complaint filed February 14, 1959, in Superior Court for New Haven
County, Record and Brief, Vol. A-380, p. 5, Buxton v. Ullman, 147 Conn. 48, 156 A.2d
508 (1959).
29. State v. Nelson, 126 Conn. 412, 11 A.2d 856 (1940), is the only recorded prosecu-
tion in 81 years.
30. See Borchard, supra note 27, at 492; Davis, sura note 22; Note, 61 HARV. L.
REv. 1208, 1214 (1948).
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The Connecticut court avoided the constitutional question by finding that the
statute did not jeopardize the life or health of married persons.
The scope of the Supreme Court's constitutional analysis of the statute may
depend on whether this finding is upheld on review. If life and health are not
endangered, the impact of the statute on private conduct might be characterized
as relatively inconsequential, similar perhaps to the effect of legislation
regulating economic activity. Appellants would then be limited to
attacking the statute as arbitrary or capricious. To repel this argument, the
state need only demonstrate that the statute was passed in the exercise of a
recognized state power and that it bears a reasonable relation to the end sought
by the legislature. 31 On the other hand, if appellants can persuade the Court to
find that the statute does increase the risk of death or illness, the state may be
forced to demonstrate an overriding interest which can justify this intrusion
upon the person. Such a demonstration has, in effect, been required by the
Court in cases involving regulation of speech, religion, and other highly re-
garded liberties.3 2 Whether or not such rights occupy a preferred position
in the constitutional hierarchy, at least it can be said that they "come to [the]
Court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties
which derive merely from shifting economic arrangements. '33 Closer judicial
examination of the state's interest in these cases is based upon the great im-
portance of the right regulated to the freedom of the individual and to the
maintenance of a democratic society.34 The Supreme Court has never explicitly
applied this rigorous test to legislation which jeopardizes life and health. But
if concern for a democratic society rests, as it must, upon the desire to main-
tain conditions which promote the fullest development and self-realization of
31. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955), in which the
Court said:
The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial con-
ditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a par-
ticular school of thought.
See also Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942) ; Kauper, Supreme Court: Trends it Constitutional Interpretation, 24 F.R.D. 155,
174-75 (1958).
32. E.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958); Bates v. Little Rock,
361 U.S. 516 (1960) ; West Virginia State Bd. of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943) ; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) ; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923). See also Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949) (collection of cases in
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter). See generally BLAcK, THE PEOPLE AND
THE COURT 215-22 (1960).
33. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
34. E.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943);
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1943) ; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 327 (1937) (dictum). See also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., concurring); Richardson, Freedom of Expression and the Function of
Courts, 65 HAmv. L. REv. 1, 3-7 (1951).
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the individual, maintenance of those conditions would seem to require at least
an equal concern for the preservation of life and health.
The duty of the Court to guard against statutes which endanger life and
health seems to have been recognized in Jacobson v. Massachusetts,3 5 in which
the Court warned in dictum that it would not sustain application of a com-
pulsory vaccination statute when such application would result in serious
jeopardy to life or health. Such an application of the statute, the Court sug-
gested, would be "so arbitrary and oppressive... as to justify the interference
of the courts to prevent wrong and oppression."3
Even if the right to life and health deserves constitutional protection, ap-
pellants must also demonstrate that the Connecticut statute actually threatens
that right. Their opportunity to raise this issue may be foreclosed, however,
by the Court's traditional reluctance to reexamine a finding made by a state
legislature.3 7 Although in other constitutionally protected areas, such as free
speech, the Court probably would not defer to a legislature's finding that cer-
tain restraints "do not impair free speech," the Court's exercise of independent
judgment in that case could be justified by observing that the necessary com-
ponents of free speech are a matter of constitutional interpretation. But when
the issue is whether a state statute puts life and health in jeopardy, or, perhaps
more accurately, whether the existence of the statute increases the risk of harm,
the legislature's judgment seems more one of fact. The legislature simply
decides whether alternative methods of birth control (such as abstinence)
are as effective as the prohibited contraceptive devices. Even in this case, how-
ever, it is not clear that the Court should defer. Since the "factual" judgment
effectively forecloses further inquiry into a possible constitutional infringe-
ment, arguably the state's determination of this issue cannot be binding upon
the tribunal ultimately responsible for protecting such rights.3 8, Indeed, the
prevention of unreasonable threats to life and health may be so important
that the Court should ignore the "reasonable alternative" justification and
should weigh the relative importance of the state's interest whenever a statute
merely prohibits one among many reasonable methods of preserving health.39
35. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
36. Id. at 38.
37. See cases cited note 31 supra.
38. In cases coming to the Supreme Court from state courts, the more closely the
so-called issue of fact coincides with and threatens to conclude the ultimate constitutional
question in the case, the more intensively the Court seems to "analyze the facts in order
that the appropriate enforcement of the federal right may be assured." Norris v. Alabama,
294 U.S. 587, 590 (1935). This approach also seems to have been used in such coerced
confession cases as Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954) (see especially the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Minton) and Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960), in which
lower court findings of "fact" were, in effect, reviewed and reversed.
39. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 259 F.2d 626, 627 (5th
Cir. 1958) suggests that "the State cannot deny to any individual the right to exercise a
reasonable choice in the method of treatment of his ills ... .
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Of course, a statute may be constitutional despite its threat to life and health
if the state's interest is sufficiently important to justify imposition of the peril.
The acceptance of military conscription during wartime is perhaps the best
evidence of this possibility.40 Since the interests of the state and the individual
must be balanced, therefore, it seems necessary for the Court to appraise the
approximate degree of danger to life and health. A state interest found insuf-
ficient to justify legislation creating a serious risk to life and health might be
sufficient to justify a less serious threat. Admittedly, decisions involving first
amendment freedoms seem not to recognize differing degrees of infringement.
They suggest instead that whenever a challenged law is found to abridge a
freedom, it must be declared invalid.41 But the conclusion that a right is or
is not "abridged" may itself be the result of analysis in which the relative
weight of both interests are compared. Indeed, any court which recognizes that
constitutional rights are not absolutes must employ this comparative weighing
at some point in the process of decision.
Whether the Connecticut statute jeopardizes life and health depends upon
the consequences of being forced to use methods of birth control other than
contraceptives. The Supreme Court, in considering an argument that a Massa-
chusetts vaccination statute was unsafe, ruled that it could not disturb the state
legislature's finding if that finding was supported by common knowledge and
a respected body of medical opinion.4 2 Tested by this standard, the judgment
imputed to the Connecticut legislature-that alternative methods of preventing
conception are equally effective--cannot withstand review. The alternative
specifically suggested by the Connecticut court was abstinence. Abstinence,
however, is a result, not an alternative. What the statute really relies on as
an alternative is the continued good judgment, intelligence, and physical and
emotional control of man and wife living together. If the propensities and
weaknesses of human nature are considered relevant to assessing the risk of
injurious pregnancy, the efficacy of abstinence as an alternative is doubtful.
43
Furthermore, even if prolonged abstinence were possible, it is frequently
identified by psychiatric and medical authorities as the cause of a wide range
40. See Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918). For judicial reliance on this
analogy in similar situations, see Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (Holmes, J.).
See also Silesian-American Corp. v. Markham, 156 F.2d 793, 798 (2d Cir. 1946) (L. Hand,
J.).
41. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
42. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 30 (1905).
43. See, e.g., HORNEY, THE NEUROTIC PERSONALITY OF OUR TImEs 158-59 (1937);
STONE & STONE, A MARRIAGE MANUAL 105-06 (1953).
A Connecticut court makes the following remark:
Do the frailties of human nature and the uncertainties of human passion render
[abstinence] impracticable? That is a question for the legislature, and we cannot
say it could not believe that the husband and wife would and should refrain when
they both knew that intercourse would very likely result in a pregnancy which
might bring about the death of the wife.
Tileston v. Ullman, 129 Conn. 84, 92, 26 A.2d 582, 586 (1942).
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of physical and emotional illnesses,44 effects which must also be considered
in evaluating the total impact of the statute on life and health. Other alterna-
tives also seem unsound. Medical opinion regards the rhythm method of birth
control as unreliable;45 its use always involves a substantial possibility of
pregnancy both because of unpredictible physiological factors and because
of the requirement of long periods of abstinence in order to maximize its
effectiveness. Withdrawal, or coitus interrptus, is also believed unreliable;
moreover, this practice can result in serious emotional disturbances. 46
Abortion, of course, creates far greater dangers to the physical and emotional
health of the mother than would the use of contraceptives ;47 indeed, in many
cases in which a woman's health makes pregnancy undesirable, an abortion
would be even more dangerous than pregnancy.48  Sterilization, while un-
doubtedly reliable, involves the irrevocable surrender of the possibility of
having children. This alternative seems unreasonable, especially since the
physical, genetic, or emotional conditions which currently make pregnancy
unwise may subsequently be rendered curable through medical science or
eliminated by a change in the circumstances of the parties.
49
After determining the statute's effect upon the individual, the Court must
then examine the state interests advanced in support of the statute. The two
possible levels of judicial inquiry should again be distinguished. The Court
must first determine that the statute is not an arbitrary or capricious exercise
of state power. If the statute affects a constitutional right, the Court must go
beyond this initial test and weigh the state's interest against the possible
infringement.
The only state power from which the statute can draw its justification is the
police power to regulate public health, welfare, and morals. Despite the ab-
sence of legislative statements indicating its purpose, the statute might be
44. See FENICHEL, THE PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY OF NEUROSES 187-88, 455 (1945) ;
DICKINSON, TECHNIQUES OF CONCEPTION CONTROL 40 (1950). See collection of author-
ities in Brief of Planned Parenthood Federation of America as Amicus Curiae, app. D.
45. See JANNEY, MEDICAL GYNECOLOGY 398 (1950); DECKER & DECKER, PRACTICAL
OFFICE GYNECOLOGY 320 (1956); ST. JOHN-STEVAS 49. For a survey of physicians'
opinions regarding the "reliability" of contraceptive devices and methods, see 12 Human
Fertility, No. 1, March, 1947, quoted in Brief for Appellants, p. 15.
46. See Brief for Appellants, p. 15; KROGER & FREED, PSYCHOSOMATIC GYNECOLOGY
276 (1951).
47. Abortion to preserve the health of the mother is legal in Connecticut. CONN.
GEN. STAT. REv. § 53-29 (1958).
48. This was the case, for example, with Appellant Jane Doe. See Brief for Appel-
lants, p. 5.
49. The correction of such conditions is regarded as possible in the instant case. Brief
for Appellants, p. 7.
Moreover, sterilization has been looked upon by the Court, in other contexts, with great
skepticism. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (which may
tacitly overrule Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927)) ; PRITCHETT, THE AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTION 562-63 (1959) ; Berns, Buck v. Bell: Due Process of Lawf, 6 WESTERN POLITICAL
Q. 762 (1953).
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regarded as an attempt to foster each of these broadly defined goals. As a
public health measure, the statute would be predicated on a finding that contra-
ceptives are inimical to health. The due process test of reasonableness which such
public health statutes must meet has been considered in a number of Supreme
Court decisions. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts 50 the Court upheld a compulsory
vaccination law when it found that the legislature, in choosing between two
divergent bodies of medical opinion on the efficacy and safety of vaccination,
had chosen the theory which "accords with the common belief and is main-
tained by high medical authority."51 And in Lambert v. Yellowley 5 2 the Court
sustained a federal statute limiting the use of spiritous liquors for medicinal
purposes, noting that such a limitation "in the presence of the well known
diverging opinions of physicians, cannot be regarded as arbitrary or without a
reasonable basis.' 53 From the fact that the Court has upheld such statutes
only after determining that a respected element of the medical profession en-
dorsed the legislature's theory, it may reasonably be inferred that a statute
which lacks such endorsement would be held unreasonable. Since the medical
profession is virtually unanimous in considering the use of contraceptives
an effective method of medical treatment which is in no way adverse to
health, 54 the Connecticut anticontraceptive law, as a public health measure,
would probably be struck down as lacking a reasonable basis for enactment.
Thus the question of whether the statute infringes a constitutional right would
never be reached.
Alternatively, the Connecticut statute may be viewed as an exercise of the
state's police power to promote the welfare of its citizens. In State v. Nelson
the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut noted that "if... a purpose [of
the anticontraceptive statute] was to promote a maintenance and increase of
population, that would not be an inadmissible motive... ."5 This explanation
of the statute strains credulity, especially in view of the fervid moral back-
ground of the statute.50 Nevertheless, the statute does have a rational nexus
to population growth, and population is a valid state concern. Nor would it
be arbitrary to apply the statute without exception, since, as one Connecticut
50. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
51. Id. at 30.
52. 272 U.S. 581 (1926).
53. Id. at 595. See also Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545, 561-63 (1924)
(lack of consensus among medical opinion).
54. The effectiveness and safety of the use of contraceptives was conceded by both
the state and the Supreme Coirt of Errors. Buxton v. Ullman, 147 Conn. 48, 57, 58, 156
A.2d 508, 512, 514 (1959). A collection of 844 medical articles on the subject is included
in Brief of Planned Parenthood Federatibn of America as Amicus Curiae, app. C. For
the minority view that use of contraceptives is medically injurious, see MooRE, THE CASE
AGAINsT BIRTH CONTROL 28 (1931) ; SUTHERLAND, LAws OF LIFE 41, 47 (1935), cited
in ST. JOHN-STEVAs 45.
55. 126 Conn. 412, 425, 11 A.2d 856, 862 (1940).
56. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
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court has suggested, permission to issue contraceptive devices for medical
purposes would put such devices in the hands of less ethical practitioners and
might "extend the field of exemption indefinitely." 57 This interpretation of
the statute, however, raises squarely the constitutional issue of danger to life
and health, because it admits as its basic premise that conception is more likely
when the use of contraceptives is prohibited. The relative importance of the
statute in promoting population growth does not seem sufficient to justify
infringement of a constitutionally protected right. The fluctuations of a state's
population level in a mobile society are so dependent upon such factors as a
favorable economic climate and adequate civic facilities that any influence
which prohibiting the use of contraceptives would have is probably lost in the
totality of other factors.
The most plausible approach to the Connecticut statute is to characterize
it as an exercise of the state's police power to promote the public morals. The
availability of contraceptives can be seen as encouraging conduct, such as
adultery and fornication, which the state considers harmful to the community.
It is claimed that making contraceptives unavailable reduces the incidence of
these acts by increasing the fear of illegitimate pregnancy.58 Jnder this inter-
pretation, the statute appears to be a rational measure " directed toward a
problem of recognized state concern. If the statute impinges on a constitution-
ally protected right, however, it will be relevant to consider whether it is a
necessary means to achieve the state's objective. It has been argued that
because Connecticut has criminal statutes prohibiting adultery and fornication,60
the anticontraceptive statute is cumulative and not central to the prevention
of these evils. 6' It is not clear, however, which of these two methods of pre-
vention is ancillary to the other. Since adultery and fornication statutes are
largely ineffective because of the difficulty of detection and enforcement, pro-
hibition of the use and sale of contraceptives may well be the most effective
method of control.
The balance of state and individual interests may tip decisively in favor
of the individual's right, however, if the Court, in weighing the state's interest,
considers only the interest of the state in applying the statute to persons like
57. State v. Nelson, 126 Conn. 412, 425, 11 A.2d 856, 862 (1940).
58. In State v. Nelson, 126 Conn. at 424, 11 A.2d at 861, the court said:
[N]ot all married people are immune from temptation or inclination to extra-marital
indulgence, as to which risk of illegitimate pregnancy is a recognized deterrent ....
See also Appellees' Brief, p. 14, Tileston v. Ullman, 318 .U.S. 44 (1943). which claims that
"the general availability of such articles would ... facilitate dissolute action among un-
married people...."
59. The deterrent effect claimed receives some support from available data. See KN-
SEY, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUJmAN FEMALE 332 (1953).
60. CoNN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 53-218, 53-219 (1958).
61. 58 MxcH. L. REV. 929, 931 (1960); ef. Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147
(1939).
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the appellants in Poe. While the legislature's fear of creating an uncontrollable
exemption furnishes a rational basis for refusing to allow a medical exception,
this fear may not be a sufficiently compelling reason when weighed against the
resulting threat to life and health. A similar problem was considered in Butler
v. Michigan,6 2 in which the Supreme Court reversed a state court conviction
based upon a statute prohibiting the sale of literature which tended to corrupt
the morals of youth. ""re have before us legislation not reasonably restricted
to the evil with which it is said to deal," the Court noted.
3
The incidence of this enactment is to reduce the adult population of
Michigan to reading only what is fit for children. It thereby arbitrarily
curtails one of those liberties of the individual.., that history has attested
as [one of] the indispensable conditions for the maintenance and progress
of a free society."
While the Supreme Court can dispose of these cases by finding that the.
Connecticut statute jeopardizes life or health in violation of the fourteenth
amendment, a more sweeping constitutional defect in the statute has been sug-
gested in the briefs. The American Civil Liberties Union, as amicus curim,
urges that the statute infringes upon a right to privacy guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment and is therefore unconstitutional as applied to all
married persons. 65 The Court has expressed concern in the past about the
privacy of the individual and the privacy of the home. This has been particu-
larly evident in fourth amendment decisions which contain the most explicit
recognition of the integrity of the home. 66 The Court has also spoken, in Public
Utilities Comin'n v. Pollak,67 of the existence of a right to privacy in the
context of fifth amendment due process. In upholding the playing of radio
programs on a commercial bus line in the District of Columbia, the Court
observed that "however complete his [the bus rider's] right of privacy may
be at home, it is substantially limited by the rights of others when its possessor
... rides in a public conveyance." 68 A passenger in a public vehicle, the Court
said, does not possess "a right of privacy substantially equal to the privacy to
which he is entitled in his own home." 69 But these dicta concerning overt
forms of intrusion furnish no basis for suggesting the existence of a right to
62. 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
63. Id. at 383.
64. Id. at 383-84. See also Paramount Film Distrib. Corp. v. City of Chicago, 172 F.
Supp. 69, 72 (N.D. Ill. 1959).
65. Pp. 6-16. See also Brief for Appellants, pp. 28-29.
66. See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 366 (1959); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25, 27 (1949) ; cf. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 145-46 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting).
67. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
68. Id. at 464. See also Brandeis & Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv.
193 (1890); Griswold, The Right To Be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 216 (1960).
69. Ibid. But see Black, He Cannot Choose But Hear: The Plight of the Captive
Auditor, 53 CoLuM. L. REV. 960 (1953).
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privacy so sweeping in its terms that it would encompass the regulatory inter-
vention of the anticontraceptive statute. Nor do they suggest any guides for
defining and limiting so broad a right.
The indiscriminate breadth of this right-to-privacy approach tends to obscure
a more specific constitutional objection to this particular statute-the fact that
through this law the state interferes with and restricts the sexual relationship
of husband and wife.70 It is difficult to imagine any area of human activity
which more reasonably ought to be beyond the reach of the state. Already in-
cluded among the liberties of the fourteenth amendment is the right of parents
to direct the education of their children, established in Meyer v. Nebraska 71 and
in Pierce v. Society of Sisters.72 The Connecticut statute impinges upon a privi-
lege far more basic to the individual's fulfillment and well being and to the
protection of the married state than the liberty established in Meyer and Pierce.
Justice Brandeis, in his dissent in Olnstead v. United States, expressed the
fundamental importance of this area of human activity:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable
to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's
spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only
a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in
material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their
thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against
the Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men.73
Recognition of either the right to privacy or the more narrow marital right
will call for a balancing of state and individual interests different than that in-
volved when a right to life and health is made the basis of constitutional ob-
jection. Rather than carving out an exception for persons whose life and health
are endangered, the Court would have to hold the statute unconstitutional as
applied to all married persons-in effect invalidating the entire statute. Thus
the consequences to the state's anticontraceptive policy are far more serious.
By the same token, however, violation of the right to privacy or the marital
right is unequivocal and is not tempered by the comparison of statistical prob-
abilities peculiar to an infringement of the right to life and health.
70. See 58 MicH. L. R-v. 929 (1960).
71. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
72. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
73. 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
APPENDIX A: BIRTH CONTROL LEGISLATION
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-213 (1956); ARx. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-944 to 82-954 (1947);
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 601, 4301-25; COLO. Rv. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-9-17, 66-10-3 to
66-10-12 (1953) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 53-32 (1958) ; DM. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2501-
04 (1953) ; HAWAI REv. LAws §§ 155-73, 302A-1 to 302A-3 (1955) ; IDAHo CODE ANN.
19601
334 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
§§ 18-603, 39-801 to 39-810 (Supp. 1959) ; IND. ANN. STAT. §9 9-601, 10-2803 to 10-2804
(Supp. 1960) ; IoWA CODE ANN. §§ 725.5 to 725.10 (1950) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
1101 (1949); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 214.190 to 214.270 (1953); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14.88 (1951); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 134, § 11, ch. 25, § 114 (1954); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 41 (1957) ; MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, §§ 20, 21 (1956) ; MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 28.229; MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 617.25 to 617.27 (1947); MIss. CODE ANN. § 2289
(1957) ; Mo. REv. STAT. § 563.300 (1949) ; MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 94-3609, 94-3616
to 94-3619 (1949) ; NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-423, 71-1104 to 71-1114 (1958) ; NEV.
REV. STAT. §§ 202.190, 202.210-202.230 (1956); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A :170-76 (1953);
NEW YORK PEN. LAW §§ 1142 to 1145; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-194 (1953); OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. §§ 2905.32 to 2905.37 (Page 1953) ; OR. REv. STAT. §§ 435.010 to 435.130,
435.990 (1959); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4525 (1945); S.D. CODE § 13.1726 (1952);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-19-1 (f), 58-19-2 to 58-19-11 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 36,
§ 7323 (1947); WASH. REv. CODE §§ 9.68.030, 18.81.010 to 18.81.080 (1951) ; Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 151.15 (1957). See also P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 10, § 315, tit. 24, §§ 201-03, tit. 33,
§§ 1051-52 (1954).
